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1.  Introduction 
The  inquiries of most  Indo-European linguistics into 
the problems  of modal  expressions have  concentrated on the 
modal  forms  of the verbal inflectional paradigm:  the in-
junctive, the optative,  the  subjunctive,  the indicative, 
the  imperative.  This  limitation has  itff,reason in the very 
structure of the  ancient IE languages:  the wealth of  forms 
within the verbal paradigm called for  an explanation;  and 
quite  obviously a  subset of these inflectional forms',  the 
modal  ones,  were  involved in the  expression of moods.  An 
idealistic representation of moods  in IE,  still found  in 
many  writings  on the  sUbject,  would hold that the  expression 
of the  semantic properties called mood  was  co-extensive 
with the modal  verb  forms.  On  the  other hand,  some  of these 
same  Indo-Europeanists,  speculating about the  origill'. of 
tlle  modal  verb  forms,  have  advanced the hypothesis that 
these would all ultimately be  traceable to indicative  form~ 
with some  elements --particles,  or even verbs,  like the 
verb  'go',  as  one hypothesis holds-- added to the indica-
tive and eventually coalesced with it into  a  single form. 
I  am  interested in the  assumptions underlying these hypo-
theses, viz., that it must  be possible for  a  language  to 
function perfectly well by expressing moods  without special 
verb  forms  such as  an optative or a  subjunctive. It seems' 
to me  that such assumptions  are very reasonable but that 
they are in conflict with the idealistic representation 
mentioned first. 
This conflict, it seems,  has been carried over into 
descriptive studies of the  expressions  of mood  in the 
Ancient IE languages.  Difficulties arose  when  these  ex-
pressions were  to be described within the  framework  of the 
verbal category of mood,  while it was  obvious,  as  e.g.  in 
Greek,  that other categories,  like a  special type  of - 2  -
negation and  a  modal particle,  and the person of the verb, 
and many  other factors  concurred in the  expression of mood. 
Semantic properties were  then ascribed to the verb  alone 
instead of to a  whole  array of formants.  The  results were 
often felt to be unsatisfactory by the  authors  themselves. 
One  modal  verb form turned out to have different meanings 
that were  hard to reconcile. 
In this view both the optative  and the subjunctive, 
as far as  we  can trace them back,  had  always  two  basic and 
irreducible meanings,  volitional (volitive)  and prospective. 
Of  course,  we  might  say with Ed.  Schwyzer in his Greek 
Grammar  (p.  310)  that volition was  historically first and 
prospectivity developed later;  or that it might  just as 
well have been the other way  round.  But  the arbitrariness 
of  such assertions is only too  obvious.  The  problem of will 
and wish in modal  expressions will never be  solved as  long 
as  one  takes these notions  as unanalyzed primitives.  I  may 
not be  able to offer a  final solution to this problem;  but 
one  thing seems  clear to me:  In the  semantics  of "will"  we 
must  ask who  is the person who  wants  something;  from  whom 
does  he  want it; what is it that he wants.  And  to find this 
out,  we  must  go  far beyond the  category of the verb. 
It was  in the United States that theories  as well  as 
methodological tools were  developed to  cope with the problem 
of describing syntactic  and  semantic  structures of high 
complexity,  which could never be properly understood when 
limiting one's  focus  to  one particular morphological 
category.  I  should mention here the stimulating work  on 
the cases,  but also the recent attempts to describe various 
types  of  complemont  sentences. 
It is my  intention to make  two  major points in this 
paper: 
1.  The  first has  to do  with finding  a  frame  within which 
the modal  expressions  of one  particular Ancient IE language 
--I have  chosen Classical Greek-- can be best doscribed. 
I  shall try to point  out that the regularities which we - 3  -
find in these expressions must  depend  on  an underlying prin-
ciple,  represented by abstract structures.  These  structures 
are  semanto-syntactic,  which me ans  that the semantic pro-
perties or bundles  of properties are arranged not in a  linear 
order but in a  hierarchical order,  analogous  to a  bracketing 
in a  PS  structure.  The  abstract structures we  propose have, 
of  course,  a  very tentative character.  They  can only be ac-
cepted as far as  evidence  for them can be  furnished. 
2.  My  second point has to do  with the modal verb forms  that 
were  the object of the studies of most  Indo-Europeanists. If 
in the innermost bracket of  a  semanto-syntactic structure 
two  semantic properties or bundles of properties can be  ex-
changed without  any further change in the total structure, 
and if this change is correlated with a  change  in verbal mood 
forms  and nothing else,  then I  think we  are faced with a  case 
where  these  forms  can be  said to  have  a  meaning  of their OWU. 
I  shall also try to  show  how  these meanings  are to be under-
stood as bundles  of features rather than as unanalyzed terms. 
In my  final remarks: I  sha11 try to outline the bearing 
these views have  on  comparative  IE linguistics. 
2.  The  Structure  "DISJUNCTlVE" 
In traditional grammars  of Greek,  including some 
historical ones, it is customary to class conditional 
sentences  along with all the other embedding  sentence typos 
into  one  major class representing the hypotactic  sentence 
structures. However,  I  believe that conditional sentences 
have  a  basic structure --I propose to call it "DISJUNCTIVE"--
which differs vastly from  other complex  sentence structures. 
Let us  examine  some  conditional sentences  in Greek. - 4  -
(1)  Eur.  B.  947  dUuai'  an  ei bouloio 
'Should it be that you wished to,  you could do  it' 
We  distinguish between the two  major parts of this complex 
sentence:  (1)  the protasis or if-clause represented here by 
the conjunction-particle ei 'if' plus an optative verb form 
2nd person singular;  (2)  the  apodosis,  which he  re precedesi 
the protasis  and is represented by an optative verb  form 
2nd person singular and the modal particle an.  I  use  the 
term "conditional sentence"  to  cover the entire complex 
sentence consisting of  a  protasis and  an apodosis. 
From  school  grammar  we  learn that if either the pro-
tasis or the apodosis  or both are negated,  they have to take 
different forms  of negation.  One,  ou(k) ,  is usually de-
I 
scribed as negating statements of fact.  The  other,  ~, is 
commonly  referred to  as  "prohibitive".  The  latter seems  to 
imply at least three semantic  elements:  1)  speaker addressr 
ing interlocutor in a  command;  2)  negation;  3)  a  cons'e-
quence. It could be paraphrased as:  'Don't you let it happen 
(or be)  that  ••• '. The  protasis requires the prohibitive, 
rather than the factual negation;  in the  apodosis  the 
constraints are reversed. 
(2)  Ouk  an  dUuaio  ei mi  bouloio 
'Were it to be the  case that you were  not willing, 
then one  could hardly imagine  your being able to' 
A further constraint limit$ the occurence  of the modal par-
ticle to the  apodosis,  excludes it from the protasis. 
If one  looks at  a  number  of conditional sentences  of 
this type, it seems  odd that the protasis should invariably 
be negated by means  of the prohibitive negation.  The  problem 
has remained  a  puzzle for Hellenists  and comparativists; 
and it will remain  a  puzzle  as  long as  one  is inclined to 
think that the prohibition refers to the propositional 
content --Le. mainly,  the verb-- of the protasis. vmat 
the  speaker wants  to  exclude is not,  or not necessarily, 
the propositional content of the protasis;  he  wants to 5  -
prevent the protasis from being stated in a  positive form. 
To  illustrate this with an  example  from English: 
Don't  come  to work  tomorrow,  and I  won't pay you. 
When  saying this it is not that I  don't want him to come  to 
work;  quite  on  the contrary.  But I  want to prevent the pro-
tasis from being stated in a  positive form.  The  positive 
imperative is used to  indicate that the  speaker wishes  to 
state the protasis in a  positive form: 
Come  to work  tomorrow  and 1'11 pay you. 
Let  me  hear that again and 1'11 hit you. 
Summing  up  our description so far:  in a  conditional 
sentence  things behave  as if there were  a  higher verb,  not 
phonetically expressed but quite clearly traceable,  which 
must  have  a  volitive connotation and which therefore call$ 
for  a  prohibitive negation. It must be aperformative verb, 
the  action which it denotes  consisting in uttering it. Let 
us  assume  this higher verb to be I  CLAIM;  we  shall see 
later that we  need  such  a  verb  on quite independent  grounds. 
The  type  of conditional sentences studied so far  ShOWff 
further pecularities which reveal to us more  ab out their 
underlying semanto-syntactic structure.  Consider 
(3)  A.  Th.  260  aitoumenoi moi  koüphon ei doies telos 
'\vere  you  only willing to  grant me,  who  request 
it, an  easy end' 
This is a  complete utterance which  shows  all the structural 
properties of  a  protasis of  a  conditional sentence:  it does 
not. admit the  modail.  particle; when it is negated,  tl:;l.e 
prohibitive negation has  to  appear: 
, 
(3')  •••  ei me  doies  telos 
'1:Jere  you  only not willing to  ••• 
But  a  major semantic  change  can be  seen in these  indepen-
dent protasis-like expressions when  compared with the 
conditional sentences:  in expressions  like (3')  the voli-
tive semantic  element --and this includes the negative 
counterpart,  the prohibition-- does  not relateto a - 6  -
particular form  of stating the protasis;  instead, it directly 
relates to the verb,  i.e. to the propositional content of 
the  protasi~. 'I want  (don't want)  this to happen'.  We  still 
have not covered all the  semantic properties that can be 
detected in sentences like (3').  To  say it very roughly, 
they presuppose the existence of  a  corresponding apodosis, 
not phonetically expressed and  semantically unspecified, 
but nevertheless present.The "intuition of  a  native speaker 
of Classical Greek",  in the presence of 'if only'-clauses, 
clearly perceives  an unspecified  'then such-and-such'  to 
be present  as weIl. 
We  also find apodosis-like  sentences presupposing an 
unspecified protasis: 
(4)  Ar.  Nub.  747  takhu g'an du.naio  manthanein 
peri rhutmön 
'(Then of course)  you could quickly learn 
about the patterns,' 
Again we  have  a  complete utterance  showing all the struc-
tural properties of  an  apodosis in a  conditional sentence. 
The  modal particle is normal here;  if negated;  the factual 
.23:!  is obligatory.  The  presupposed',  unspecified protasis 
could be filled by such phrases as  "if such-and-such be 
the case,  then ••• ". 
From  the  examples  given so  far,  one  may  gather that 
the optative verb form is typically connected with this 
kind of conditional sentences,  protaseis  and  apodoseis. 
This,  however,  does not mean that an optative must  necessa-
rily appear in these  sentences;  nor that the  optative may 
not  appear in very differently structured modal  expressions 
as we  shall see later on. 
We  shall now  look at a  new  set of modal  expressions, 
structurally quite parallel to the preceding ones,  with 
one  semantic difference.  Verb  forms  of the indicative 
preterit (mostly imperfect)  are used here instead of the 
optatives: - 7 -
(5)  Diphil.  Neineke  fragm.  com.  14,  p.  421  , 
ei me  to labern en,  oude  hers poneros  en 
'If taking did not exist,  nobody would be bad' 
This is a  prov-rb  and  does  not refer to any specific time. 
But  even  apart  from their use in proverbS',  these preterits 
have  not temporal reference whatsoever. If we  are to assume 
that preterit verb  forms  have  a  meaning of their own  --and 
we  want  to make  this assumption,  and we  even want to justify 
it-- then we  will have to recognize the fact that reference 
to the past cannot be  one  of the distinctive propertie& of 
its meaning.  P. Kiparsky  (FL  4/1968)  has  shown  evidence for 
the hypothesis that in Ancient IE languages"  past tense is 
systematically related to  an underlying adverb  denoting 
anteriority. 
The  semantic difference between conditional sentence$ 
containing optatives  and otherwise identically structured 
sentences  containing preterits can be described as pro-
spectivity vs.  factivity.  'Should it be that you  wanted to, 
you could do  it' refers to  something which may  happen at 
any time  from  now  on.  'If taking did not exist,  nobody 
would be  bad'  does not convey the  idea of such a  prospect. 
On  the other hand;  sentences with preterits like  (5)  have 
a  clear contrary-to-fact connotation:  'If taking didn't 
exist - but it does  exist  ••• '. We  note that the presence 
vs.  absence  of prospectivity is correlated with the  change 
between an optative  and  a  preterit verb  form  - and nothing 
el~e. There is no  surface structure  element participating 
in this change,  and no  other abstract semantic  element 
intervening. It is precisely this fact which we  have in 
mind when  we  say that we  attribute a  semantic property 
[+prospectiveJ  to the optative verb  form  and the  absence 
of  such a  feature to the preterit verb form. 
That otherwise the  structure of the modal  expression 
in (5)  is quite parallel to  the  one  in (1)  can be  seen from 
a  glance at (6)  - (7): 8  -
(6)  Eur.  Herael.  731 
e1the  estha dunatos  dran hoson prothumos  er 
'0 that you were  able to do  as mueh  as  you are 
inelined to' 
This is a  protasis-like expression with an apodosis  unex-
pressed but nevertheless presupposed.  The  negated version must 
show the prohibitive negation 
(6' ) 
, 
e1the  m~ estha dunatos  ••• 
'Were  you  only not willing to  • • • 
and the volition relates direetly to the verb whereas  in (5), 
exaetly like in (1), it must relate to  a  verb outside the 
eonditional sentenee.  An  apodosis-like  sentenee is shown in 
(7) 
;  , 
Elegon  an  ••• 
I Perhaps  i t  ,vere better if 1  said ••• 
(7')  Ouk  an  Hegon 
'1 would not say ... 
Some  protasis like "if things were  sueh-and-sueh"  or "given 
such a  situation"  ete. is presupposed. 
The  parallelism is thus  complete with the  one  exeeption 
of prospectivity and  of the two  modal  verb  forms.  Note that 
mixed types  of modal  expressions  oeeur,  with  a  preterit in 
the protasis,  as in (1)  - or reversed.  But note that the 
semantie property of eontrary-to-faet is eorrelated with the 
protasis only,  not with the  apodosis.  Therfore,  counter-
factualness  eannot be  attributted as  a  semantie  feature  to the 
preterit, but must  rather be  related to the total strueture 
of  the modal  expression. 
Let us finally consider  a  very different type  of  eon-
ditional senteneeffi: - 9  -
(8)  Eur.  fr.  294.7 
Ei theoi ti drosin aiskhr6n,  ouk eisin theoi 
'If the  gods  do  shameful things,  then they 
aren't really gode' 
We  find indicatives of the present both in the protasis and 
in the apodosis.  The  negation in the protasis has to be pro-
hibitive, in the  apodosis factual.  But no  modal particle is 
present. And  the protasis by itself used as  a  complete  utte~­
anee  does not oceur.  Moreover,  although the  apodosis  could:. 
oecur independently,  'they aren't gods', it does not,  as  the 
other apodoseis  did,  presuppose  a  protasia.  To  make  the firat 
part of (8)  an aeceptable independent protasis;,  we  would have 
to  change the indieative present into either an optative or 
an indicative preterit. In this instanee we  see that the 
disjunctive strueture of independent protaseis is directly 
eorrelated with either the optative or the preterit - and 
with nothing else.  On  these  grounds  we  would  say that both 
the  optative  and the preterit verb  form  themselves must 
earry in their meaning  some  feature which we  might call 
[+dissociativeJ  and whieh is absent  from  the indicative pre-
sent as weIl  as  from  the  subjunctive. 
3. Abstract Structures:  The  basic structure  "DISJUNCTlVE" 
NOT  EVi  OR 
A.  I  CLAIM  YOU  «LET HAPPEN  EVl )  AND  (LET  HAPPEN  EV2)) 
a.  I  CLAIM  NOT  YOU  « ..•  )), 
B.  I  CLAIM  YOU  «LET BE  EVl )  ANTI  (LET  BE  EV2)) 
C  •  I  CLAIM  EV 1  AND  EV 2 - 10 -
Structure A.  would represent  example. (1)  and a.  example  (2). 
B.  represents  (5),  C.  (8).  The  other examples  are derivable 
from these  structures by such processes  as deletion.  The  first 
thing to keep  in mind  ab  out these proposals is their extremely 
tentative character.  If they cen  b;)  acce~)ted, it is only 
inasmuch as  they reflect and dir:'ctly account  for the regular-
ities which we  have been pointing out before  or which we 
might still discover. 
The  second important thing is the bracketing. It indi-
cates that the various  semantic factors  concurring in a  modal 
expression show  a  hierarchy analogous  to the  one  in a  phrase 
structure.  This  allows  for entities inside  a  bracket being 
changed without  affecting the remainder of the structuret  on 
the  contrary,  things  outside the brackets being changed while 
the  content of the brackets remains  LL~touched. It is assumed 
that only the modalities  of  sentences  are being represented 
here;  for the remainder which is sometimes being referred to 
as  the propositional content,  I  have  deliberately chosen the 
vague  label of Event  (EV). 
The  NOT  EVl  OR  which precedes all disjunctive structures 
was  chosen in various  grounds.  First, it has  been suggested 
that the  'if - then'  structure must be traceable to  some  more 
basic  semantic  structure while  the  anaphoric  pronominal 
element  'then'  points to  something derived.  Second,  and more 
specifically,  every conditional  sentence  seems  to make  allow-
ance  for the  opposite  of the protasis being true.  In the 
usage  of Greek this is reflected in many  ways::  often,  a 
positive conditional sentence is followed by one  with a 
negative protasis:  'if - then;  if not - then'.  A frequent 
characteristic feature consists in the  omission of the first 
apodosis,  where  the translator often supplies  a  'then o.k.': 
; 
(9)  A 135-7  all'  ei men  dösousi  geras megathÜIDoi 
'\,  ,"  " 
Akhaioi·  •••  ei de  ke  me  döosin,  ego  de  ken 
autos h61ömai 
'If the Achaeans  want  to present me  with the gift 
(,then o.k.); if not,  I  shall take it mys elf  , -11-
The  third reason is represented by the fact that NOT  EVl 
assumes  truth value  and the protasis becomes  contrary-to-fact 
just in case the abstract  element  BE  appears  (structure B.). 
It seems  plausible that counterfactiveness to become  a 
semantic factor requires  an  element like BE  referring to 
something that exists and is incompatible with an element 
like HAPPEN  referring to the future. 
HAPPEN  and BE  and  absence  of either one  (in C.)  are intro-
duced to  account for this difference,  but also to  account for 
the difference which we  found between prospective and factive. 
I  CLAIM:  if it is true that  every conditional sentence 
potentially links  a  protasis with its opposite,  then somebody 
must  do  the  linking;  the  somebody is the  speaker;  and the 
linking is brought  about by aperformative verb.  But  we  aBid 
nerore that we  also need aperformative verb to ac  count for 
the way in which the speakerwants the protasis to be  stated, 
positive or not positive.  The  verb,  we  said,  must have  a 
volitive connotation.  Hence  my  proposal of I  CLAIM. 
ANTI  is to  account for the fact that in a  conditional 
sentence  the protasis presupposes  the  existence  of  an  apodosis 
and reverse.  An  independent protasis  Ilf only  ••• '  could be 
derived from the complete  structure by deleting the  content 
of  the  second bracket.  The  bND  remains.  The  strongest evidence 
for the reality of  the  abstract  l~D comes  from the fact that 
this ANTI  does  appear as  land'  (kai)  on the surface under 
uertain definite conditions.  Consider 
(10)  S.  Ai.  550 
o pa~ genoio patros eutukhesteros,  ta 
d'~ll'  homolos·  kai genoi'  an  ou kak6s 
'0 son,  may  you become  luckier than your father, 
in other respects  equal,  then (literally:  and) 
you will not be bad' 
The  conditions are  as follows:  the LET  of the protasis is 
not represented by ei  lift,  and the llND  is not represented 
by any anaphoric  pronominal  element like t6te  'then'.  We - 12 -
thus find that the surface structure constructions of the 
'if Athen B'  type  are in complementarity with constructions 
of an  'Imperative A  and B'  type.  Thus  they both must  go  back 
to the same  underlying s1n"u.oture. 
YOU  is the  addressee of I  CIJcIM.  In independent protaseis, 
when the content of the second bracket is being deleted,  we 
could get rid of  one pair of brackets.  But  I  have not been 
able  so far to find a  device that would place the YOU  in the 
immediate neighborhood of LET,  which would  then account for 
the fact that volition in this instance directly relates to 
the  content of the protasis.  I  also do  not understand why  in 
such exclamations  'if only ••• !' the  addressee may  be not the 
interlocutor but  an imaginary person. 
LETcis  to account for the contrast between volition and 
nonvolition in modal  expressions.  This is the most difficult 
aspect of all. We  reserve treatment until we  have  seen the 
behavior of LET  in the other structures. 
4.  The  basic structure  "SUBJ1JNCTIVE" 
The  term here refers not to the modal verb form  (although 
it is true that subjunctives  occur quite typically,  but not 
necessarily,  in these structures); it refers to  a  special 
type of modal  expressions.  Here  we  give the structures first 
and then illustrate them with examples: 
D).  I  Performative?  (X  LET  lUPPEN  EV) 
a. X '"  I 
(11)  11.  262  Ou  g~  po toious iden ani.ras  oude  ~dn!llJli 
11  have never seen such men  nor do  I  expect 
to see  any' - 13  -
We  are interested in the  conjoined sentence  'and not  do  I  ex-
pect to see'  showing  a  subjunctive verb form  and the non-
-prohibitive negation.  We  perceive  an element  'prospective' 
in the  expression. 
b.  X  = YOU 
(12)  11.  26  , 
me  se,  geron,  ••• kikheiö 
'Let me  not catch you,  old man!' 
We  find  a  prohibitive negation,  a  sUbjunctive,  and  a  clear 
volitional connotation. 
(13)  ..  ,- 11.phes  matho 
'Let me  learn!' 
More  literally something like 'let that I  learn!'  11.  govern-
ing verb in the imperative  and  adependent  subjunctive form. 
Again a  volitional connotation. 
c.  X = 3rd person (he,it); it =  EVl  :  EVl  LET  HAPPEN  EW2 
(14)  Hdt.  2.161  The  Egyptians  thought that 11.prias  had 
deliberately sent them  into  a  seemingly bad spot, 
hina  d~ spheön phthort genetai  (subjunctive), 
autos  d~ tön loipön Aigyptiön asphalesteron 
arkhoi  (optative) 
'so that they would perish and he  could more 
safely dominate the remaining Egyptians' 
Only the  sub  ordinate clause is given here in the Greek origi-
nal. It shows  a  connotation of intent,  thus  of volition, 
which is clearly correlated with the  expression  'deliberately 
sent'  which precedes. 
We  may  now  be  in a  better position to dispel  some  of 
the  darkness  around  the notion of volition.  Suppose  we  started 
--as suggested in some  writings  on the subject-- from  an  ab-
stract verb with volitive meaning,  thus  from  an underlying 
X WANTS  HAPPEN  EW.  In (14)  this would not do  the trick,  since - 14 -
the portion WANTS  HAPPEN  EV  does not depend  on  an X = he,  but 
on  an X  =  EV  ('deliberately sent')ll  thus the formula would 
read EVl  WANTS  HAPPEN  EV2,  which is semantically bizarre. 
What  is more:  (14)  is one  of the numerous  types  of subDrdinated 
sentences;  they often show,  with very little or no  change in 
structure,  a  fluctuation between such relations as volition, 
cause  and consequence.  It seems,  from looking at  (14)  and many 
other examples,  that the  connotation of will becomes  pre-
dictable from the matrix sentence. 
Our  strategy consists in looking for  a  device that would 
account  for all instances  of volition in a  similar way,  for 
the  examples  (11)  - (13)  as well  as  for  (14).  We  thus  chose 
an abstract verb which does  not itself contain volition. It 
would  simply have  to link the preceding semantic  elements 
from which volition can be predicted with the following 
entities where volition appears  in the  surface. 
In English,  LET  would be  such averb. If the 2nd person 
precedes,  asin (12),  it automatically becomes  an imperative 
and what  follows is volitional. If the 1st person precedes, 
as in (11), it cannot be  an imperative,  and the whole  ex-
pression is non-volitional. If a  matrix sentence precedes 
which contains  an  element  of intent,  which would  ha~e to be 
marked in the underlying structure,  the  constituent sentence 
becomes volitional.  But  the  strongest support for the exist-
ence  of  an abstract LET  comes  from  Greek itself, where,  as 
(13)  shows,  the higher verb is no  longer abstract but  assumes 
phonetic  shape  and is the  imperative 'let'. This is found  in 
Attic.  In the  development  towards Modern  Greek,  this impera-
tive has  become  an inflexible particle,  as,  and is now  an 
integrating part of the  subjunctive verb  form.  In Modern Greek, 
the higher verb  would have to be  abstract again. 
One  final remark  about  the modal verb  forms  in (14): 
subjunctive  and  optative occur in otherwise parallel 
structures but with a  significant change in meaning:  the 
subjunctive indicates  an  immediate prospectivity emanating 
from  the  agent  of the matrix sentence  (ItThe  Egyptians  thought 
•••  that they might perish
lt
). The  optative indicates  a - 15  -
dissociated prospectivity linked with or emanating from 
someone  else than the  agent  of the matrix sentence. 
5.  The  Semantic Structure of Some  Verbal 
Mood  Forms 
We  found certain definite places within the bracketed 
semantic structure of modal  expressions where  a  semantic 
property is related to  a  particular modal verb form  and to 
nothing else. This,  then,  is the  ground on which we  would 
ascribe  semantie properties to these verbal forms.  The  pro-
perties may  be  tabulated as  follows: 
Optative 
Preterit 
Subjunetive 
Indicative 
prospective 
+ 
+ 
dissociative 
+ 
+ 
We  note that these properties have certain affinities with 
the  semantie structures of the modal  expressions in which 
the  forms  are preponderantly used:  the feature  "dissociative" 
common  to both Preterit and Optative is obviously related to 
the disjunctive structure of conditioned sentences where  a 
distinction between a  protasis  and an apodosis is always  made. 
However,  these features  of the verbal forms  would  evidently 
not  suffice to explain the overall structures of the modal 
expressions in which they oceur.  The  preterit, for one, 
occurs in non-disjunetive  struetures as well,  and here, 
the  feature  "dissociative" is related to the distanee in 
time between present  and paste 6. Hi,storical Considerationsr" 
The  semantic analysis  of the verbal moods  which we  have 
outlined very briefly may  help us  to understand some  of the 
changes which took place within the paradigm of modal  forms. 
We  begin to get an insight into the nature of the close 
association between the optative and the preterit which has 
led to mergera  in many  language$and different periods of IE. 
The  Latin imperfects in -ba- (amabam)  owe  their origin to  a:, 
periphrasis with the verb  'to bet  in the optative mood,  the 
modal  element -ä- beingiientical with the ä  of the ao-called  - - subjunctives (dicat)  and being the regular representation of 
the optative in thematic present tense  forms  in Italic and 
Celtic. 
The  further fate of the modal  verb forms  in Greek offers 
an interesting test case.  We  know  that the optative began to 
fade in the Hellenistic period,  and it has  almost disappeared 
in the New  Testament.  The  subjunctive form has  survived 
until this day.  Thus,  one  could say that either the optative 
and the  subjunctive,  01'  the  optative  and the preterit, have 
merged. Apriori, both developments  show  some  plausibility 
because,  as  we  see  from  the chart,  each of the pairshas one 
feature in common,  differs only by one  other feature.  We 
cannot deduce  from  the chart, i.e. from the semantic analysis' 
of the verb  forms  alone,  which  forms  actually merged.  And, 
what is more,  we  cannot  explain on the basis of the chart 
why  the optative should have  disappeared and why  not the sub-
junctive. In fact,  when  considering just the modal  forms  and 
not the total modal  expressions,  we  would  rather have  expect-
ed the optative to have  survived.  In the development of Greek 
from Homer  onwards,  the optative first made  substantial gaiD$ 
in territory,  as  can be  seen from  an inspection of Attic. In 
the Germanie  languages  the inherited optative proved to be 
the survivor,  and the so-called subjunctive forms  in Latin 
are  at least in part inherited optatives. .. l'  .. 
An  explana~i.n of all these ehanges in different 
directions oan onl,. be  sought within the larger frame  of 
modal  expressions,  and this means  for us:  within the frame 
of their underlying structures. As  for later Greek  we  note 
that within the structure "Disjunctive"  of the prospective 
subtype, preterit (imperfeet)  forms  of certain verbs with a 
futuric  connotation~, in their lexical meaning  came  to be used 
in lieu of older optatives. In the New  Testament we  find the 
imperfect of the verb  'want,  wish':  eboul6men  II  should like 
to'  instead of Attic bouloimen an.  Still later, in Modern 
Greek,  we  find forms  consisting of a  future particle tha  - (thelö hina) plus  an imperfect used in this position. Since 
we  have seen in our descriptive part that this  wa~ precisel,. 
one  of the crucial positions for the optative,  where it 
could be  shown  to have  a  meaning  of its own,  we  now  under-
stand wh,.  the replacement b,. tuture-preterits. in this very 
position must  have made  the old optative forms  superfluous. 
This presents  a  ease where  the abstract structure remains·< 
unchanged. 
But  we  also find evidenee for diachronie  change in the 
abstract structures.  The  rule that all condi  tional  8en~nee$<  , 
show  the prohibitive negation  (~) in the protasis i8  a 
peculiarity of Greek;  we  can even  see that it must  have 
developed only gradually within Greek,  since Homer  still 
showsinstances of it-elauses: with factual negation.  We  ean 
also see that this peculiarity of Attie again disappeared 
in the later developement  Of  the language:  Medern  Greek  shows 
only the factual,  not the prohibitive negation in if-clausea. 
We  would  then have to set up  different abstract struotures 
for these different stages of the language;  specifically. 
the  element NOT,  which we  placed outside the brackets tor 
Attic,  would have to be moved  inside for Homer  and  for 
Modern Greek. 
With these admittedly sketchy remarks Iwanted to make 
it clear, nevertheless,  that I  consider these abstract 
structures to be language-specific.  Of  course,  certain 
parts may  be universal.  But  I  cannot  decide definitely - 18-
which parts are universals and which other parts are 
language-specific. All I  can tell is that the parts-, that 
change  cannot be universal. 
The  task of IE syntax,  as  I  see it ahead of us,  con-
sists in passing beyond the stage of a  one-sided morpholo-
gical approach. It seems  a  feasible task to describe the 
underlying principles of modal  expressions in tha older 
IE ianguages  and to formulate  them in terms  of abstract 
structures.  Fl'om  thel'e we  can move  on to observing histo-
rical change. 
One  major obstacle in this kind of research I  see in 
the currently wide-spread belief that only native  speaker~ 
can do  adequate descriptions  of their languageffi.  The  belief 
is unwarranted  and has  a  pernicious effect on the furthen 
development  of IE linguistics in particular and of lingui-
stics altogether.  I  hope that some  linguis~will give up 
this belief;  01',  if this should prove too difficult,  that 
by some  miracle they m~  turn into fluent  speakers of some 
of the ancient Indo-European languages. 
*** 